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The Law’s Gender: Entanglements and Recursions — 
Three Stories from Sri Lanka 
_Abstract 
Our essay examines the recursions, rationalities, limits, and promise of the law draw-
ing on three recent cases of women who encountered law enforcement authorities and 
the courts in Sri Lanka. It provides a strong account of how dominant gender norms 
are mobilized to determine who is afforded the sanctuary of the law and who is not. 
By foregrounding the troubled encounters of the women with the law the essay also 
demonstrates the ways in which the law, culture, and the state combine, pull apart, 
and recombine in a manner that draws attention to their own internal relations; and 
how procedures established to ensure legal objectivity and judicial impartiality often 
fold back on themselves, reflecting the pliancy of the law. The essay also foregrounds 
the conditions of possibility, including feminist legal methodologies, that enable 
women to (re)turn to the law despite its transgressions. In doing so it argues for seeing 
the law as multilayered and recursive, reflecting the thick and uneven conditions under 
which women access justice in Sri Lanka. In highlighting how these women challenge 
and bargain with the law, the essay also acknowledges their tenacity and endurance in 
what, ultimately, is an effort at demanding an improved and substantive justice.  
1_Introduction 
This essay discusses the encounters of several Sri Lankan women with the law and its 
multiple loci — whether that is the police station, the courtroom, or the special inves-
tigative units of state authorities.1 In doing so it undertakes an analysis of gendered 
power relations that operate through and within the law in Sri Lanka and the specific 
sites at which the women experience its procedures and authority.  
The first encounter concerns Ramani, a fifteen year old schoolgirl and her mother 
Sita.2 Ramani was expelled from a well-known girls’ school in a major city in the south 
of the country on the grounds of “bad behavior,” having been seen in public with a 
young man.3 Ramani and her mother sought redress from the school authorities, the 
police, the national Department of Education, the National Child Protection Authority, 
the Human Rights Commission, the Southern Provincial Department of Education, and 
finally the Supreme Court on the basis of her right to education.4 While their pleas to 
these state authorities (some of which were sympathetic to their cause) failed to re-
procure Ramani a place at her original school, her legal counsel withdrew her funda-
mental rights case pending in the Supreme Court over the technicality of a time limit. 
Ramani’s education ceased and it took a further two years for her to obtain a place at 
another school — after repeated pleas by her mother to various school authorities. 
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The second encounter is that of Yoga, who was thirty years old when she first sought 
the protection of the court from a violent and hostile spouse in 2011. She filed several 
cases including an application for maintenance, a criminal case complaining of assault, 
a case for non-payment of maintenance, and finally a case alleging domestic violence. 
Despite the allegations of recurrent violence at the hands of her husband including sex-
ual violence, the Magistrate’s Court prescribed mandatory counseling. The cases, in-
cluding one filed by her husband for divorce, were stuck in the Magistrate’s, District, 
and High Courts for five years with only two of the cases (for maintenance and domes-
tic violence) concluded, the latest in January 2017 with both parties arriving at a settle-
ment.5 
The third encounter is that of Nizreen, a seventeen-year old girl who repeatedly suf-
fered parental verbal and physical abuse. Following a beating by her parents for attend-
ing a basketball match without permission, she complained to the police but instead of 
being granted the state’s protection, she was detained at the police station for three 
days, presumably as punishment at the request of her parents.6 The police finally filed 
charges against the parents, but in court Nizreen, who had no legal counsel of her own, 
came under pressure by other family members to relent and agreed to return home. On 
another occasion when Nizreen went jogging with a friend and had sent a SMS to her 
mother informing her of her whereabouts she was ordered by her father not to return 
home. When Nizreen and her friend went back to the parents’ apartment both girls were 
verbally abused by the father. Nizreen thereafter sought refuge at the home of her 
friend. Her friend’s mother, Jayanthi, apprised the National Child Protection Authority 
(NCPA), vested with the power to monitor the progress of investigations and proceed-
ings relating to child abuse, of the situation.7 
As advised by the NCPA, Nizreen thereafter filed a complaint against her parents at 
its office, whereupon her father filed a counter-complaint against his daughter at a po-
lice station in Colombo, also stating that she had left home. After repeated summons 
by the police, and despite the NCPA’s advice that she need not appear before it, Jayan-
thi presented herself to her nearby community police station with her daughter and 
Nizreen. Jayanthi noted that when she arrived it was clear that the Officer In Charge 
(OIC) had already informed Nizreen’s parents that their daughter as well as her friend 
and her mother would be at the station. Jayanthi told us that she felt “ambushed” by the 
police. On arriving at the police station Nizreen’s parents had heaped verbal abuse on 
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the three women. At no point were the parents restrained by the police. Following the 
intervention of the NCPA, Jayanthi returned with Nizreen to her own house. But given 
the intimidation by Nizreen’s father and fearing an attack on her own house, Jayanthi 
sought refuge with a relative for three days, taking her family and Nizreen with her. 
Finally, the case was mediated by the NCPA. Even though all parties came to an agree-
ment whereby Nizreen would live in her grandparent’s house and be given an allow-
ance by her parents who would also pay her school fees, the parents did not abide by 
the agreement. As reported by Jayanthi, Nizreen had to leave school before she could 
complete her final examinations and currently lives in rented accommodation while 
working a job for Rs. 20,000 (US$ 135) per month. 
By presenting these women’s entanglements with the law, this essay analyzes its 
conditions of possibility, limitations, illegibilities, and ‘rationalities.’ In doing so, it 
examines the promise of the law as a means of justice and protection and its relationship 
to other law enforcement agencies. It highlights the law’s dependence on culture for 
normative views on gender and in turn, its reinforcement of these beliefs pointing to 
how law and culture continuously recycle, reinforce, and reinvent each other.8 It fore-
grounds the overlay of several standards in the law: one which adopts a ‘reasonable 
person standard,’ (employed in claims for damages for instance) another which creates 
exceptions for women and children as specific categories, and yet another on which the 
law in practice oscillates between the two and seeks a qualification from women of 
their vulnerability and innocence in order that they may access its dispensation of jus-
tice. Seeing the law as multilayered and as folding back on itself in this way points to 
the thick and uneven conditions under which women access justice in Sri Lanka. These 
conditions are nonetheless disputed and this essay highlights how the women, together 
with their legal counsel, challenged the courts and bargained with the law in ways that 
also mark their tenacity and endurance. 
The three cases were identified through a legal counsel whom we approached for 
this purpose, given the anecdotal evidence we had of the ways in which she and her 
colleagues sought gender justice through their legal practice. This initial interview led 
us to the case files and notes which we studied on the condition of confidentiality. 
Subsequent interviews were conducted with the legal counsel as well as with Sita, Yoga 
and Jayanthi. Nizreen did not respond to our request for an interview. An interview was 
also conducted with Janasansandaya, the civil society organization that linked the legal 
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counsel to Sita. We also spoke to a woman Officer in Charge (OIC) of a Women and 
Children’s Desk of a police station related to one of the cases. A limitation of the study 
is that we could not interview other significant actors in the three cases. The study 
therefore takes a purposive approach that privileges the personal narratives of the 
women, particularly where the legal record is silent. It does so to provide a situated 
body of evidence that nevertheless resonates with broader feminist legal commentaries 
on gender justice in Sri Lanka, 9 including issues of legal pluralism, the tension between 
ideals of justice and judicial bias, and the effects on women of the co-reliance of the 
law, culture and the state on each other. The essay consciously locates itself within a 
praxis of knowledge production committed to the pedagogical, political, and ethical 
purpose of social and gender justice.10 
2_The Law in Practice 
In her recent book Duress: Imperial Durabilities in Our Times, Ann Laura Stoler, a 
scholar of colonial history, reminds us that duress “is neither a thing nor an organizing 
principle so much as a relation to a [troubled] condition” and a referent for culpability, 
force, pressure, constraint, and stamina.11 In assessing how we can best recognize and 
understand the modalities of duress, Stoler argues for a renewed use of the concept of 
recursion as a useful analytical lens. Drawing on Foucault, her call for a “recursive 
analytic” alerts us to when and where recursion and recursivity occur, and it points 
towards a conceptualization of imperial history and its power relations as those that 
neither begin or end schematically, nor continue seamlessly, nor repeat themselves mi-
metically. Rather, attentiveness to recursion shows us how power relations “fold back 
on themselves and, in the refolding, reveal new surfaces, and new planes.”12 For Stoler, 
an analytical approach centered on recursion makes colonial history available for a 
reading alert to its unevenness, instability and contingency, to its temporal overlays and 
scaling. It would also highlight the specific sites and different registers on which tech-
nologies of power intertwine and recombine.13 
The analytical purchase, or reward, of a recursive reading of how the law operates 
in Sri Lanka in relation to the women’s cases has three broad objectives. The first is 
towards understanding how culture, the law, and the state work together, pull apart, 
occlude or produce ‘an excess’ that draws attention to their own internal relations. Im-
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plicit here is an approach to the law, culture, and the state as triangulated and co-con-
stitutive rather than as abstracted, separate spheres of influence. The second is to un-
derstand that even though the law is no longer understood as gender or culturally neu-
tral,14 the requirement and public expectation of natural justice, judicial impartiality, 
and legal objectivity fold back on themselves with devastating effects for women. The 
third is to assess what room there is — without buying into the romance of legal objec-
tivity — for maneuvers towards substantive equality for women in the eyes of the law. 
In each of these lines of inquiry, the essay highlights how women’s subjectivity is cod-
ified and validated by/within Sri Lankan law enforcement. This includes the misogynist 
treatment of women that often occurs with the sanction of women in authority them-
selves. But the essay is also attentive to how women plaintiffs resist this handling. Key 
questions that underpin the analysis are: how do the law, culture, and the state fold into 
each other, and/or back upon themselves (much like the pleats of a sari) in the delivery, 
or not, of gender justice? What is the legal-cultural context (including of legal plural-
isms) that supports the regulatory, scopic, and constitutive gaze of the law as it deter-
mines women’s subjectivity? How do women petitioners experience the full impact of 
the law, and how do they negotiate the paradox that attends their belief in an ideal 
justice on the one hand, and its partial or non-fulfillment on the other? Finally, what do 
we learn from these cases about feminist legal practice in eliciting gender justice? 
A recursive reading of the law in the Sri Lankan context also provides the best ap-
proach for understanding its seemingly disjointed and contradictory aspects including 
their specific historical and cultural contexts. Take for instance the legal pluralism that 
juxtaposes personal laws alongside Roman-Dutch law, English Common Law, legisla-
tion and the Sri Lanka Constitution. Even though the principles of Roman-Dutch law 
which recognize the concept of patria potestas have now been surpassed to privilege 
the principle of the best interest of the child both in judicial interpretation as well as in 
legislation,15 the Muslim Marriages and Divorce Act, for instance, allows for the “law 
of the sect” to govern marriage which effectively results in the non-stipulation of an 
age of marriage for both sexes.16 Again, Article 16 of the Sri Lanka Constitution which 
protects personal laws, notwithstanding any inconsistences with its fundamental rights 
chapter, could permit the Thesavalamai to be invoked to disallow a woman married to 
a Malabar Tamil man, who is an inhabitant of the province of Jaffna, from transacting 
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her immovable property without his written consent.17 More recently, within legisla-
tion, the offense of statutory rape was introduced with a minimum mandatory sentence 
in 199518 but by 2008 the Supreme Court had issued an opinion concluding that a min-
imum mandatory sentence which eliminated judicial discretion in sentencing amounted 
to a violation of the right to equality and the right to be free from torture.19 Relying on 
this opinion in several cases thereafter the judiciary issued suspended sentences to per-
sons pleading guilty to statutory rape.20 Yet it is also the case that, in relation to funda-
mental rights, sexual harassment experienced by a woman teacher was determined as a 
violation of the right to equality and non-discrimination for the first time in 2016, in a 
judgment that also invoked the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrim-
ination against Women (CEDAW) for the first time.21 Evident in all of the above do-
mains of the law in Sri Lanka is a recursivity that highlights “diverse plot-lines with 
different, sometimes incommensurable temporalities, often of religion, sometimes just 
of those moments when the resonances of temporality fold or wrap to show uncommon 
or even sundry temporal spacings.”22 What this heterogeneity, including its incommen-
surabilities and friction, result in is a situation in which neither gender equality nor a 
state of active discrimination against women in the courts is fully secured. Importantly, 
this instability tells us about an indeterminacy that keeps the potential promise of the 
law open in the popular imaginary. At times, women who have no other resources of 
strong economic and social capital or political influence turn to the law as a way of 
procuring the protection of the state. They do so not necessarily because they have faith 
in the legal system but because they believe that the law can be made to protect and 
compel. 
3_The State of Law 
The police station was the first port of call for Ramani (who was detained by the police 
and therefore had no choice in the matter) as well as for Sita, Yoga, and Nizreen. While 
the police station is the primary administrative locus for the implementation of law and 
order in civilian spaces, as an agency of law enforcement it is also where, as Georgio 
Agamben noted, “the contiguity if not the constitutive exchange between violence and 
the law that characterizes the figure of the sovereign is visible in all its nakedness.”23 
For Agamben there is “nothing reassuring about the appearance of sovereignty under 
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the guise of the police.” This is because it is through the police that the state first at-
tempts to criminalize the dissenter and, moreover, decides so on a case-by-case basis. 
It thereby reinforces a “zone of indistinction between violence and the law perfectly 
symmetrical to sovereignty” — a subject upon which Agamben has consistently writ-
ten.24 Even when recent shifts to “community policing” have aimed at a more egalitar-
ian police force, its coercive capacity often facilitates misconduct, intrusiveness and 
even brutality.25 
When women go to police stations to make their initial complaints they are therefore 
aware that these are sites of asymmetrical power relations imbued with performativities 
of domination and assistance.26 They have to justify their needs at the police station 
and make a good impression to avoid being treated as suspect. Their documents have 
to be in order and the onus is on them to be persuasive. They have to aim to remove the 
physical and social distance between themselves and the decision makers, in this case, 
the OIC and the officer recording their complaint) without undermining their authority 
or disrupting the structural hierarchies of the police station. Their effort, therefore, is 
to forge a link between themselves and the bureaucrat on the basis of a common hu-
manity. Yet their inability to fully know how they will be assessed constitutes their 
precarity.27 
Jayanthi, for instance, despite the advice of the NCPA that she did not have to show 
up at the police station did so because, as she stated, “I did not want to antagonize my 
own police station in case I have some trouble and need them in the future”. 28 A strat-
egy of appeasement is evident here. It was precisely to alleviate such anxiety and to 
permit women and children empathetic access to the law that the Sri Lankan state stip-
ulated since the late 1990s that the police maintain a Women and Children’s Desk at 
its stations. However, in both the cases of Ramani and Nizreen, who were minors at the 
time they first encountered the police, the women police constables at these Desks were 
either outright hostile or lacked power to intervene on their behalf. The petition filed 
by Ramani and her mother to the Supreme Court sets out in detail that Ramani was 
slapped on the back once, repeatedly slapped on the face, scolded and called a “whore” 
by the women police constable cited as the 7th Respondent in their fundamental rights 
petition. The petition details that when Ramani and Sita were taken to the Women and 
Children’s Office of the same police station thereafter, the 7th Respondent slapped Ra-
mani yet again. This time, the Senior Woman Police Officer present had asked her 
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colleague to stop the beating in acknowledgement that official codes of conduct had 
been breached and that Ramani’s rights as both a citizen and a minor entitled to the 
protection of the state had been infringed. 
Even if not physically abused, women suffer emotional harm from humiliation by 
the police at is precincts. Sita noted that she was subjected to reprimand and insults by 
the Senior Woman Police Officer for her “failure” to guard her daughter’s virtue.29 
Clearly Sita’s defense of her daughter was judged as argumentative and adversarial, 
eliciting in turn a forceful patriarchal response, also from the women police officers. In 
fact, in the case filed by the police on behalf of the state against Ramani, possibly for 
vagrancy, the police declared Sita an “unfit mother” and petitioned the judge not to 
allow her custody of her daughter. But as the state could not provide evidence to this 
effect, the judge ruled that Ramani could continue to live with her mother.30 
This points to how the rationale that women police officers and Woman and Chil-
dren’s Desks would provide a more empathetic service to women and children unravels 
when cultural notions of honor and morality are at stake, trumping a supposed solidarity 
based on gender. In fact, the senior woman police officer, an alumna of the school from 
which Ramani was expelled, took it upon herself to report the girl to the principal on 
the basis that Ramani had brought “shame” to the school.31 The policewoman’s alumna 
status should not have been a factor in how the case proceeded. But what is evident 
here is the cultural authority police officers invoke in legal proceedings particularly 
when women are seen to have ‘overstepped the line’ sexually. Such methods of sham-
ing and censure are not only deeply crosscut by dominant gender norms but also by 
class and age. Sita’s status as a daily wage laborer with little education who had to 
place her thumbprint on documents because she could not sign her name, and so lacked 
economic and social capital, rendered her vulnerable to police humiliation. Nizreen’s 
father on the other hand, a wealthy and influential businessman, had the latitude to 
intimidate his daughter, her friend, and Jayanthi at the police station without police 
restraint. While Ramani’s gender, age, and lack of privilege made her available for 
excessive action, including violence at the hands of the police, Nizreen’s father re-
mained untouched by the (so called) long arm of the law, and became the beneficiary 
of its deliberate inaction and masculinist logic. Similarly, while Yoga’s plaints against 
an abusive husband were taken up only on the third occasion that she reported him to 
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the police, Nizreen’s father’s punitive search for his daughter elicited its prompt re-
sponse in a reiteration of how the law is often bent to favor men. 
The law as enforced at these police stations is thereby provisional and contingent, 
depends on a prior, more substantial set of ‘rules’ on morality, gender, age, and class 
that wields authority over it.32 It bends to, and works with the logic of a masculinist 
state that, by setting itself up as a protector of the vulnerable, places women and chil-
dren (as a paradigmatic category) in a subordinate and obedient position.33 Obedience 
and supplication become, then, the bargain women have to make in seeking the protec-
tion of the law. Yet as we have seen in these cases, the police officers as agents of the 
law, hardly kept to their side of the bargain. They failed to protect the interests of both 
Ramani and Nizreen, who were minors, even though the law is clear that “in all matters 
concerning children […] the best interest of the child shall be paramount.”34 The police 
also failed to protect the interests of Yoga who, as a woman, should have secured ‘the 
protection’ of the state, but had to repeatedly plead her case before action was taken. 
According to her legal counsel, the delays in processing such complaints have now 
become routine and institutionalized at police stations as a way of forcing married cou-
ples to mediate rather than litigate their disputes.35 This was corroborated by the senior 
police woman officer we spoke to who noted that they “advise and guide” people who 
come to them and that “often [the police] try to speak to the offenders and even plead 
with them not to harm their families.” An approach to encourage settlement rather than 
law enforcement is evident here even when the complaint involves gender-based vio-
lence.36 
Yoga was, moreover, additionally vulnerable as an “unaccompanied” woman and, 
according to her, subjected to the sexualized advances of the police, her husband’s law-
yer and the judge’s personal bodyguard. She noted that a police officer used her tele-
phone number (part of her record/complaint) to call her informing her that “he was in 
the area.” She also had to fend off telephone calls from other police officers and her 
husband’s lawyer who had telephoned her to say that his wife was away (in what could 
also have been a honey trap to entice Yoga and thereby prove her “loose morals”). 
Yoga also told us that, when she entered the Magistrate’s Court, she invariably held 
her handbag over her breasts to protect herself from groping and lewd stares.37 As sites 
of state-legal authority, neither the police station nor the court offered Yoga sanctuary. 
Rather they were places of danger and harassment.38 
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4_Partial Justice 
How the women experienced the law (as mediated by its agents such as the police, the 
NCPA, and the courts) suggests that, if at all, they accessed its principle of objectivity 
(intrinsic to the notion of a fair and evenhanded justice) only partially. This limited 
fulfillment of the law militates against received ideas on legal objectivity and judicial 
impartiality. What does the law become when it only partially delivers on this promise 
of justice? Can there be a “black letter” of the law without its constituent cultural DNA? 
If not, what is the impact on women when law enforcement agents continuously play 
on the continuum of law as culture and culture as law?39 In such a situation, why do 
women even persist with the law? This section seeks to answer these questions through 
a further analysis of the cases. 
In Ramani’s case the police and the school authorities, as agents of the state, were 
required by law to act “objectively” to further the stated purposes of the authority and 
discretionary power vested in them. Similarly, they were required to comply with due 
process (also described as rules of natural justice) in inquiring into any matter. These 
rules are that no one shall be judge of his/her own cause (impartiality) and that both 
parties to a case must be heard. In Sri Lanka, the duty to give reasons for decisions has 
been added as a third rule.40 These rules of natural justice are Common Law principles 
that have been developed over time by the judiciary. What rules of natural justice are 
appropriate in each context depends on several factors, including the “significance” of 
the case. Gomez, commenting on the open-ended and vague framework of natural jus-
tice, observes that it takes color from its context.41 In Ramani’s case, it took color from 
the socio-cultural context to such a degree that the discretionary power vested in offi-
cials such as the school principal and woman police officer became amplified into out-
right prejudice and arbitrariness in the service of morality and a patriarchal state. 
Regardless of the harms and hurdles faced, Ramani and her mother Sita relentlessly 
sought the fulfillment of justice. Their legal counsel noted that Sita “felt very wronged” 
by the school principal who had arbitrarily and opaquely expelled her daughter from 
school. Sita noted that she was determined to clear Ramani’s name. She declared “we 
brought her up to this level with such hardship, we have to clear her name because the 
police and the principal are lying about her.”42 The extent to which Sita persevered, 
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borrowing money to travel several times to the capital city of Colombo to plead her 
case at the national Department of Education and the Human Rights Commission so 
that her daughter could continue her education, indicates not only her resolve at regain-
ing respectability but also her pride, as her legal counsel also noted, in the fact that her 
daughter was at a “big,” i.e. prominent school in their home district. In Sri Lanka, ed-
ucation has long been viewed as a path to upward social mobility. It is valued as a 
public good and education is free from primary to tertiary level in all state schools and 
universities. This is supported by the law, which mandates compulsory schooling up to 
the age of sixteen.43 For Sita and her husband (a manual worker in a government de-
partment), education would have provided the only means by which Ramani could 
eventually access good employment and class/social mobility. Following her expulsion 
from school, these hopes were dashed. Sita reported that Ramani engaged in self-harm 
by cutting herself, and her father suffered a mental health breakdown following these 
events. Despite the loss of two years, the fact that Ramani is back in another school and 
currently studying for her G.C.E. Ordinary Level examination is, therefore, a hard-won 
positive development for the family. 
It is ironic that at the very point at which Ramani and her mother required the court 
to use its “just and equitable jurisdiction” as mandated in the Sri Lanka Constitution on 
their behalf, and when, as their legal counsel noted, “they had nowhere else to go but 
the law because they have no other influence,” the Supreme Court’s commonplace re-
liance on a technicality pressured their legal counsel to withdraw the case.  The techni-
cality was of a time limit that applies to fundamental rights petitions which requires, 
under Article 126 (2), that petitions be filed within one month of alleged infringement. 
The reason Ramani and Sita did not file their petition within the stipulated time was 
because they sought redress from other official authorities such as the national Depart-
ment of Education where they were told Ramani could resume her seat in the class 
without any prejudice or further documentation. Ramani did so, only to be chased out 
by the principal — indicative of how and when culture trumps the law and morality 
overrides the right to education. Ramani’s plea to the Supreme Court therefore came 
as a matter of last resort after other avenues had failed. 
Evident here is a law that “treats injury as primarily a breach against itself so that 
the human being [in this case Ramani] who is violated, becomes only an instrument by 
which the law reinstates its own authority.”44 This instrumentality becomes obvious in 
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how the court uses time to deem it an infringement of its rules yet disregards time 
altogether when it comes to the long procedural delays in the completion of cases such 
as those filed by Yoga.45 In relation to fundamental rights petitions themselves, the 
Constitution mandates that they shall be determined within two months, but the Su-
preme Court considers this as directory rather than mandatory.46 Furthermore, the tech-
nical language of the court (in referring to the thirty day rule) appears impartial but in 
effect frustrates the very purposes for which the fundamental rights jurisdiction was 
established through the Sri Lanka Constitution in the first place. After all, Ramani and 
other citizens like her turn to the “exclusive” jurisdiction of the Supreme Court pre-
cisely when all other attempts have failed. 
Yet the legal counsel’s decision to withdraw the fundamental rights petition also 
occludes a history of legal flexibility on the matter of the time bar (the thirty-day limit 
for filing fundamental rights petitions). For while temporality does constitute a statute 
of limitation within the law, there have been cases where the judiciary has dispensed 
with this requirement, adopting a purposive interpretation of the Article.47 While this 
history of judicial discretion went unexplored in Ramani’s case, the withdrawal of the 
case also ensured only a faint trace of it: as a Minute on the case in court records rather 
than a full judicial account, for instance, of the harms done to Ramani and Sita, which 
would have become part of the public record had the case proceeded. It is noteworthy 
that for Yoga, however, whose cases were recorded in court, it was a matter of concern 
that the public had access to them. She worried about her husband’s reaction to this 
public record. Yoga had no idea until we spoke to her that her case was in the public 
domain.48 This poses an interesting question as to what constitutes privacy in a public 
space such as a courtroom or a legal archive. It also illustrates the tangible threats 
women litigants experience due to family/social pressures that often result in their si-
lencing, self-censorship, and even withdrawal from the law. 
Even though the law failed these women or at best only partially fulfilled its prom-
ise, Ramani, Sita, Yoga, and Nizreen turned to the law. Despite her three-day detention 
at the police station and the raw display of police/state power against her, Nizreen pre-
sented herself at the door of the law at every turn to plead her case, refusing to passively 
return to her parental home, which would have meant accepting their rules as to how 
she should behave. Sita told us that she did not get justice, but when asked what advice 
she would give someone from her village in a similar situation she declared “they will 
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have to go down the same path. You cannot let it go. Injustice requires you to fight it.” 
For women like Sita the only path to access justice was through the police and the court. 
Yoga noted that she felt like giving up several times but that this attitude changed when, 
through a school friend, she met and obtained the support of her legal counsel. She 
declared that in order to fight a case in court women should “not expect immediate 
solutions, should litigate only if they are mentally strong, have time to waste, and have 
the capacity to bear scolding and harassment.” Yet she added that despite its inadequa-
cies there was no other option but the law. Evident here is that for these women a flawed 
and even hostile legal system was still something to work with as long as they could 
obtain legal aid and other forms of support as opposed, for instance, to relying on ex-
trajudicial means (ritual/religious practice seeking divine justice and retribution) or vig-
ilantism. In this instance, as “law abiding” citizens who wanted to remain within the 
law, they chose the authority of the state and the means by which it promises justice in 
relation to dispute resolution. 
5_Feminist Legal Methodologies 
What room is there in this context for feminist maneuvers towards ensuring substantive 
equality for women in the eyes of the law? The discussion so far on the behavior of 
women police officers and the school authorities has shown that women cannot be re-
lied upon to protect, or even to be fair and evenhanded, to other women even if this is 
the law’s mandate. Yet the woman police officer we spoke to was quietly emphatic that 
they work within an ethic of care. She stated “'those who come to us are very poor, they 
come with a lot of sadness. Often we end up buying things for them because they have 
so many needs. Recently we even bought medicine for a child who came to us — the 
mother couldn't afford the medication. We don't need to go to a temple to earn merit, 
we earn it through our work.” However, the mismatch noted so far between intent, 
accomplishment, and action indicates that empathetic law enforcement by the police 
relies on a social sorting where the type of ‘violation’ and judgment on the merits/de-
merits of the complainant/defendant come into play. At the same time the police’s abil-
ity to abide by ‘the letter of the law’ depends on power relations that are both internal 
and external to it. For this same officer also noted that when school and medical au-
thorities are reported to them as adversaries they have to “manage these matters care-
fully.” This indicates that personnel in these two sectors (who can even be of assistance 
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to the police at an individual level by virtue of their professional, political and social 
influence) wield power over and above the law. 
Moreover, even when the women police are sympathetic to a woman plaintiff or a 
minor — such as the officer recording Nizreen’s complaint — they often lack the power 
to persuade their male colleagues to act impartially and respectfully to women. The 
OIC we spoke to noted “as a woman police officer I face challenges […] even though 
I am an OIC I don't have a designated phone line or vehicle. They regard us as less.” 
This points to how Women and Children’s Desks themselves are accorded low priority 
within police stations in an internal, structural hierarchy that is prejudicial to women, 
including women police officers. Indicative of their struggle to equality was the legal 
challenge women police officers mounted and won in 2007 against a discriminatory 
promotion scheme whereby the cut off mark for male police officers had been set at 48 
whereas for the women it was 68.49 
Data from our cases show, however, that where women seem to have made a differ-
ence are in the areas of legal aid and methodologies of legal practice. Sita and Ramani 
were helped by Janasansandaya, established in 1993 as a people’s forum to fight in-
justice. Working on legal advocacy, awareness raising, legal aid, medical, and psycho-
social assistance, documentation and rehabilitation of victims of severe harms such as 
torture, the organization is based in Panadura, in the south of the country.50 Sita noted 
that the work of Janasansandaya was known in her village and that the organization 
“was there for her every step of the way.” They assisted her financially and introduced 
her to the Human Rights Commission in Colombo. The organization was their link to 
the law and the state and their promise of justice. The work of Janasansandaya is also 
significant in the context of both poor legal literacy in Sri Lanka and the necessity for 
an overall assessment of the prevalence of systemic violations of rights and entitle-
ments. Explaining the legal options and administrative remedies available for a partic-
ular case is one way in which the organization helps clients to make informed choices 
where there is little education on the law. Secondly, it uses its strategic position as a 
grassroots organization to map a larger picture of prevalence of violations. A woman 
officer working for Janasansandaya noted that Ramani’s case was one amongst many 
in which girls were being kept away from school and denied access to education for 
violating an unwritten and implied moral code. 
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While the legal counsels of Ramani, Sita, Yoga, and Nizreen do not have a feminist 
practice of their own (although this was a goal one of them aspired to), they are three 
young women who work in Colombo in the Chambers of a reputed male lawyer. They 
took on all three cases on a pro bono basis. When asked what she thought was different 
about the way they conducted their legal practice, the lawyer who appeared for Ramani, 
Sita, and Yoga told us “we like to tell the whole story and present that whole story in 
court even though judges get impatient.” This was corroborated by Yoga, who noted 
that the client counseling she received from her lawyer was patient, respectful, and 
empathetic. She stated “for lawyers our cases are not big ones although for us they are 
big” and she was grateful that her lawyer had given her the time and space to unburden 
herself. She also noted that her lawyer’s documentation was meticulous, pointing to a 
legal practice that was conscientious and organized. In the context of the sexualized 
advances of the male police, lawyers, and security guards that Yoga had to withstand 
she noted that she found security in consulting a woman lawyer. Evident here is a sol-
idarity whereby an ethic of care was offered to the client in the context of the break-
down of faith in the police and law enforcement. 
Questions remain, however, as to what really constitutes a feminist legal practice. If 
legal practice in Sri Lanka generally requires adherence to an ethical code that consists 
of counsel-client confidentiality, the cab rank rule, duty to court over duty to client, and 
avoiding conflict of interest, what is it that a feminist legal practice can add to this list? 
Discussing the Sri Lankan women’s movement’s demand for legislation prohibiting 
domestic violence, Morseth de Alwis posits what could be considered a feminist en-
gagement with the law. This list demands dehegemonizing the law based on a critique 
of its content and enforcement, acknowledging its tendency to privilege itself as an 
institution to the detriment of alternative mechanisms of redress, asking when and how 
to engage with the law, and even strategically retreating from it when necessary.51 
Morseth de Alwis further asks that we be aware of how and when “the feminist imper-
ative to break the silence is often at odds with the social imperative to maintain silence” 
particularly when women come under family/social pressure to remain quiet on harms 
such as domestic and sexual violence. She calls therefore for the exposure of a “justice 
system [that] is not oriented towards women who are unable or unwilling to break the 
silence.”52 
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The legal counsel we spoke to for this study was acutely aware of the law’s limita-
tions on gender justice, yet her chosen vocation was to work within the law and the 
courts. Her decision, for instance, to withdraw the fundamental rights application of 
Ramani and Sita from the Supreme Court can be seen, on the one hand, as caving into 
pressure from judicial technicalities related to the time bar. As already noted this had 
the effect of diminishing the public record on the violations experienced by Ramani 
and Sita and stopped short of testing legal flexibility on the interpretation of the tech-
nical rule. Yet the withdrawal could be also viewed as a strategic retreat, and even an 
internalized feminist refusal to work with the law so that other avenues maybe kept 
open. For once a case is dismissed, it adversely affects the litigant’s chances of return-
ing to the Supreme Court with the same case or seeking other administrative redress. 
For legal counsels working with the law, these decisions, the end-result of which cannot 
be fully known in advance, are complex. They often result in a compromise that abides 
by the law yet supplements it — albeit not completely undermining it — in other ways. 
In the cases we have highlighted so far, this supplementarity included providing the 
women ethical humane legal counseling, friendship, and a feminist solidarity in a cri-
tique of power towards gender justice. 
6_Conclusion 
Through a gendered analysis of women’s experiences of the law in Sri Lanka, this essay 
has illuminated the operations of the law, and how law, culture, and the state intersect 
and work together, sometimes opaquely (in the manner the school authorities acted), at 
other time excessively (police violence, misogyny and bias). The essay thus highlights 
how, if culture is a way of life and a range of practices, those in authority practiced 
their culture by intervening through the law. In doing so it provides a strong account of 
how dominant gender norms are mobilized by law enforcement authorities and those 
adjudicating the law to determine who is afforded sanctuary within it and who is cast 
out. It also demonstrates how the law becomes contingent when law enforcement au-
thorities adopt what is essentially a cultural stance in respecting those with social/pro-
fessional status even if they are miscreants. The essay thereby has a number of im-
portant implications for the question of whether we should re-think conventional calls 
for a return to ‘law and order’ where systems have failed or when social breakdown 
has occurred. For these calls emerge from an understanding of the law that somehow 
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treats it as capable of being outside of culture and the social. Such calls also ignore the 
fact that the law relies on the transgression of its rules so that it can performatively 
reiterate its authority. Such self-reflection on the law is particularly timely for contem-
porary Sri Lanka, given the country’s current context of postwar transitional justice 
that has elicited a heavy reliance on law reform and institutional redesign as the way 
forward. 
While law and culture are co-constitutive, they are nevertheless not completely in-
distinguishable from each other for they also perform different operations of power.53 
The essay illustrates, for instance, how while culture’s authority foreclosed all possi-
bilities for Ramani from re-enrolling in her school, the law’s authority left the door 
ajar, enabling her access to the Supreme Court (albeit partially because of the with-
drawal of her case), just as much as Nizreen was able to access the NCPA. The essay 
thereby notes a paradox in how and why women turn to the law despite their frustration 
at the failure of “natural justice” at the sites of both law enforcement and the judiciary. 
It argues that when conditions such as free legal aid or legal support before authority 
figures are favorable, women turn to the law because in the public imaginary, the law 
continues to provide the ‘legitimate’ means by which to protect oneself against in-
fringement. The essay has also raised questions about what a feminist legal methodol-
ogy means in a context where a masculinist legal system has failed to procure all 
women who come before it their entitlements. Overall, by zooming in on the stories of 
Ramani, Sita, Yoga and Nizreen and their troubled encounters with the police, the state, 
culture and the law, the essay has demonstrated the ways in which these institutions 
combine, pull apart, and recombine according to contingent situations and reflected on 
where and how these assemblages occur. 
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